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Abstract
The excessive use of credit cards and increasing consumer borrowing has been a major problem.
Laibson (1997) suggests the present-bias problem as one of the driving forces of excessive bor-
rowing. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) suggest that self-control underlies national borrowing/savings
rate. We conduct a survey to check for present-bias as well as self-control problems among indi-
viduals in Turkey. Our findings show that different income groups have similar discount factors,
i.e., impatience levels, but very different degrees of dynamic inconsistencies, i.e. present-bias
levels. In particular, 29.4% of low-income individuals exhibit present-bias whereas this is down
to 6.4% for high-income individuals. Using the parameters we achieve through the surveys,
policymakers can design appropriate commitment devices for time-inconsistent individuals to
ensure a sustainable level of aggregate saving and financial investment.
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1 Introduction
According to world bank database, the worldwide average savings rate has been decreasing, and
has reached to a 35-year historical minimum, 19% in 2009. The decreasing savings ratio is of
special importance especially in developed countries, and has been discussed in various studies.
Hershfield (2011) attribute this decreasing rates to the increasing life expectancy. That is, people
people live longer, and hence experience longer retirement period compared to past, but their
saving behavior cannot keep pace by saving more for longer retirement period. Discounting is the
key aspect in savings behavior since savings can be perceived as choices over time. Considerable
amount of research in finance, economics and psychology show that people’s preferences, and hence
discounting factor, change over time. This phenomenon, which is referred as time inconsistency,
and its consequences have been examined both by experiments and field studies. Some of these
researches have shown that short-run discount rates are by far higher than long-run rates (see Thaler
(1981) for instance). Harrison et al. (2002) show that discount rates differ among households for a
given time horizon as well as across time horizons for given households. Using field data instead
of experiments, Laibson et al. (2007) also reject the hypothesis that the short-run discount rate is
equal to the long-run discount rate.
We analyze the behavioral aspects of failure to save, in particular the dynamic inconsistency in
time preferences. We are interested in the reversal of time preferences as a dynamic inconsistency.
Kirby and Herrnstein (1995) show that individuals exhibit a reversal of preferences when choosing
between a smaller-sooner and a larger-later reward. The “smaller” reward is preferred (present-
bias) if it offers an immediate payoff, whereas the “larger” reward is preferred if both options
are delayed. Similar findings are of particular interest to the finance literature, since self-control
underlies the national saving rate (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). Hence, a deeper understanding
of self-control problems would contribute to increased national savings. Besides, a number of
studies suggest that time inconsistency also drives credit card borrowing (Laibson, 1997; Fehr,
2002; Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2008). These results have inspired researchers to improve standard
exponential discounting which assumes a constant discount rate in time. One of the commonly
used formulations of such time preferences is based upon a quasi-hyperbolic structure (for example
Laibson (1997); O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)). Using such a model, Meier and Sprenger (2010)
find that people with dynamically inconsistent preferences have higher active borrowing levels.
They also argue that the present-biased individuals have significantly higher credit card debt.
Frederick et al. (2002) suggest that the key to understand the intertemporal choice is finding the
right discount rate. Therefore using a questionnaire, similar to that of Meier and Sprenger (2010)
with imaginary monetary outcomes, we aim to calculate the discount factor (level of impatience) and
to measure the present-bias in different income groups. By doing so, we wish to highlight the income
effect on individuals’ discounting differences. A quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (see Laibson
(1997)) is used to pursue this aim. This model allows for inconsistent individuals who think they
will save in the future but fail to accomplish that when the future arrives. A representative random
sample of 65 subjects from Turkey is used for the survey which is distributed to two income groups;
low and high. The former group is randomly selected among workers from a factory in I˙stanbul,
whereas the members of the latter are randomly selected from a financial institute also in I˙stanbul.
We show that discount factors in fact do not differ with respect to income groups. However there is
a significant evidence that the level of present bias is different across income groups. The findings
show that the ratio of people with dynamic inconsistency (present-bias) is much higher in the low
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income group (29.4%) than in the high income group (6.4%).
Using the parameters we achieve through the surveys, we can recommend a commitment device
to policy-makers to ensure a sustainable level of aggregate saving and financial investment for time-
inconsistent individuals. This especially becomes important under the finding that low income
individuals require more “nudge” than those with high income.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we discuss the quasi-hyperbolic model and its
Samuelsonian predecessor. We discuss the survey, the dataset, and the variables together with an
example in the end. Section 3 provides the numerical results regarding the impatience levels and
the present-bias in different income groups. Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief discussion
of the findings.
2 The Model
It is natural that one chooses an earlier monetary reward to a later one of equal size. Depending on
the level of impatience of an individual, there might be a certain decrease in the earlier reward which
makes the individual indifferent between the earlier and later rewards. Subjective impatience of an
individual over a time horizon can be found out by his/her indifference between two such rewards.
In the standard Samuelson (1937) utility discounting, the rewards on a timeline is discounted
exponentially. An overall time preference model hence looks as follows:
U = u0 + δu1 + δ
2u2 + δ
3u3 + . . . (1)
This model assumes that, given the subjective discount rate of an individual δ, the subjective
utility of a reward ut in time t, in the future, is discounted by δ
t to present time. For the sake of
simplicity, we use monetary rewards as the utility itself, e.g., the utility gained by a payment of 5
TL1 equals 5. Therefore, a reward of size x next year is only as good as a reward now equal to
δx. The disadvantage of this model is that it assumes a constant discounting level for individuals.
It has been shown, as discussed in the introduction, that many individuals change the way they
discount when the decisions involve a choice between now and next year instead of two points in
time in the future, e.g., a choice between 6 years and 7 years from now.
Laibson (1997) suggested a revision of the standard model by incorporating a present-bias
element. In this model, decisions involving rewards now and in the future are differently discounted
that decisions involving two future payments. This extension of the standard model to quasi-
hyperbolic model is given below:
U = u0 + β(u1 + δu2 + δu3 + . . .) (2)
The novelty of this formulation of time preferences is that it provides room for explaining the
behavior of so-called “time-inconsistent” individuals. Assume that the individuals are asked to
choose between two payments; one in the 6th year, and one in the 7th year. Then the decision will
involve comparison of the following: βδ6u6 and βδ
7u7. When simplified, this is effectively a choice
between u6 and δu7. In that case it is identical to standard discounting model being used since
Samuelson. However a decision between now and next year is different: u0 and βδu1. In case an
1TL: Turkish Lira, the native currency of the subjects who responded to the survey. At the time the survey was
conducted the real exchange rate of the Turkish Central Bank was: 1 US$ = 1.8099 TL
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individual has present-bias, the decision involving present time is favored. This favoring is done by
discounting the later payment by an additional parameter β on top of δ.
2.1 The subjects and the survey
We use a questionnaire which was implemented also in Meier and Sprenger (2010). The survey
is conducted in Turkish, subjects’ native language, and is answered by 65. We categorized the
subjects into two groups according to their income levels; low-income (LI) and high-income (HI).
Individuals are considered as low-income if their monthly income is below 2000 TL. More than 70%
of the individuals in the LI group do not own a car or have rental costs. Individuals with incomes
above 2000 TL constitute the HI group2. The LI subjects comprised of 31 individuals whereas the
HI subjects amount to 34. The ages of the subjects vary between 21 and 56, with a (rounded)
average of 31.36 and a median age of 29.
The survey consisted of three parts (see Table 2 in Appendix A.1). The first part of the survey
asks, in 6 questions, the subjects to choose between two options. The point which subjects switch
from Option 1 to Option 2, in this part, gives us the interval of discounting between today and
next month. The second part of the survey asks, in 7 questions, the subjects to choose between
two options. The point which subjects switch from Option 1 to Option 2, in this part, gives us
the interval of discounting between today and 6 months later. The last part of the survey asks,
in 6 questions, the subjects to choose between two options. The point which subjects switch from
Option 1 to Option 2, in this part, gives us the interval of discounting between 6 months later and
7 months later.
To preserve the consistency within the data, we filtered some of the individuals from the initial
subject pool which was slightly larger than 65. In particular individuals who always answered
every question with 1 (such as a person who would always ask for the earlier payment whatever the
difference is between earlier and later payment), and those who always answered every question by
2 (those who would always go for the later payment, regardless of time difference and the payment
difference).
2.2 Dataset and the variables
In the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, we have one discount factor and one present bias pa-
rameter from the questions in Part 1 and 2 (δ1 and β1). We also have one discount factor and one
present bias parameter from the questions in Part 1 and 3 (δ2 and β2). The average of the two
discount factors gives us δ and the average of the two present bias parameters gives us β which
we shall use as independent variables in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. The detailed
derivation of these parameters can be found in Example 1.
• δ1 and β1: The discount factor and the present bias parameter induced by the indifference
acquired from the first 6 questions in Part 1 and the 7 questions in Part 2 (the first 6 questions
are discounted by β1δ1 and the next 7 questions are discounted by β1δ
6
1).
2Note that the labeling does not necessarily reflect the wealth of individuals. Since the number of subjects who
are interviewed are limited, we did not categorize them into more income groups.
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• δ2 and β2: The discount factor and the present bias parameter induced by the indifference
acquired from the first 6 questions in Part 1 and the last 6 questions in Part 3 (the first 6
questions are discounted by β2δ2 and the last 6 questions are discounted by δ2).
• δ: This is the average of the two discount factors (δ1 and δ2) described above.
• β: This is the average of the two present bias parameters (β1 and β2) described above.
We first look for individuals with a dynamic time-inconsistency, i.e., self-control problem or
present-bias. Such individuals exhibit different switching points in the first and the third part of
the survey. In particular, an individual with present-bias, exhibits a more delayed switch from (i) to
(ii) in Part 1 than in Part 3. Although in both parts the time-delay between options is one month,
the questions in Part 1 involves an option “today”, i.e., present time. This causes the individuals
with self-control problems delay their switch for the higher and later reward.
We define the critical points for each part, where individuals switch from option (i) to option
(ii). For instance, in Part 1, assume an individual prefers 65 TL today to 80 TL one month later. If
this individuals prefers (in the next question) 80 TL one month later to 60 TL today, then we say
the critical points are 60 TL and 65 TL. We take the average of those critical points and assume it to
be the level of payment that would steer indifference between options (i) and (ii), e.g., indifference
between 62.5 today and 80 one month later.
Given the critical points in each part, the levels of indifference between the two options in (i)
and (ii) lead to following formulations. In Part 1, the two options u0 and u1 lead to: u0 = βδ× u1.
In Part 2, the two options u0 and u6 lead to: u0 = βδ
6 × u6. In Part 3, the two options u6 and u7
lead to: u6 = δ × u7. Now we provide an example to show the derivation of the parameters.
Example 1. Consider the answers of an individual below. See appendix for the questionnaire.
Part 1: Individual X, switched from option (i) to (ii) when the reward in option (i) fell from
65 to 60 today, versus a reward of 80 next month in option (ii).
Part 2: Individual X, switched from option (i) to (ii) when the reward in option (i) fell from
60 to 50 today, versus a reward of 80 in 6 months in option (ii).
Part 3: Individual X, immediately switched from option (i) to (ii) when the reward in option
(i) was 75 in 6 months, versus a reward of 80 in 7 months.
To find the critical points, we assume the average in Part 1, i.e., 62.5 today, to be the indifference
level with 80 tomorrow. Similarly in Part 2, we assume 55 today to be the indifference level with 80
in 6 months. In Part 3, we assume 75 in 6 months to be the indifference level to 80 in 7 months.
Then we check whether the agent shows present bias, i.e., if the individual switches from option (i)
to option (ii) earlier in Part 3 than in Part 1.
This individual makes the switch to higher payment in Part 3 immediately, whereas same time
horizon becomes much more tempting in Part 1 since it involves present-time (the switch to higher
payment in Part 1 occurs only when the payment now gets as low as 60 TL). The calculations
proceed as follows with decimals rounded up to 3 digits:
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The system of equations from the answers to Part 1 and Part 2 leads to:
(Discount parameter 1: δ1) Part 2 and Part 1: u0 = β × δ61u6 and u0 = β × δ1 × u1. Then,
β×δ61 = u0/u6 = 55/80 and β×δ1 = u0/u1 = 62.5/80. Combining these two leads to δ51 = 55/62.5.
Therefore δ1 = 0.974.
(Present-bias parameter 1: β1) Part 1: u0 = β1 × δ × u1. Using δ1 and solving for the data leads
to β1 = u0/(δ1 × u1). Therefore β1 = 62.5/(δ1 × 80) = 0.801.
The system of equations from the answers to Part 1 and Part 3 leads to:
(Discount parameter 2: δ2) Part 3: u6 = δ2 × u7, which implies that 75 = δ2 × 80. Therefore
δ2 = 0.937.
(Present-bias parameter 2: β2) Part 1 and Part 3: u0 = β × δ × u1 and u6 = δ × u7. Using δ2 and
solving for the data leads to β2 = (u0/u1)/(u6/u7) = (62.5/80)/(75/80). Therefore β2 =.0.833
The systems of equations derived from the 3 parts in the questionnaire gives us 2 parameters for
both the discount parameter δ and for the present-bias parameter. Note that for the individuals who
do not show present-bias, the latter parameter trivially becomes 1 and hence the model simplifies
into Samuelson type of time-preference.
To sum up, the average discount parameter of individual X is δ = (δ1 + δ2)/2 = 0.956. The
average present-bias individual X exhibits is β = (β1 + β2)/2 = 0.817.
3 Results
We provide the results for both groups, high income (HI) and low income (LI), together with
the total population (Total). The values are given in 3-digit decimals. We first provide discount
factors when present-bias is completely ignored, i.e., using the conventional standard exponential
discounting. Thereafter we show our findings with the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model.
3.1 Impatience under standard exponential model (without present-bias pa-
rameter)
As explained in the introduction, the standard model in Samuelson (1937) neglects the self-control
problem which is known as present-bias. Since there is only a single parameter in this exponential
model, i.e., δ, each part in the questionnaire leads to a (possibly different) discount factor; δ1, δ2,
and δ3. We take the average of these discount factors to produce an approximation of the individual
discount factors.
When the present bias parameter is not taken into account the standard exponential model of
time preferences induces the following discount factors for the two groups:
• HI: 31 individuals exhibit on average a discount factor, δ = 0.833,
• LI: 34 individuals exhibit on average a discount factor, δ = 0.810,
• Total: 65 individuals exhibit on average a discount factor, δ = 0.821.
Note that these findings imply that high-income individuals exhibit more impatience than the
low-income individuals. However it turns out there might be an explanation for this rather unex-
pected outcome. Next we apply the quasi-hyperbolic model and check for present-bias. It turns out
almost one third of low-income individuals exhibit present-bias whereas for high-income individuals
this is the case for a small minority (2 out of 31).
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3.2 Impatience and present-bias under quasi-hyperbolic model (with present-
bias parameter)
We check for self-control problems in the data and found in total 12 (10 in LI group and 2 in HI
group) individuals with present-bias. 29.4% of low income individuals and 6.4% of high income
individuals exhibit present-bias. The rest of the population is dynamically consistent and hence
with no present-bias, i.e., β = 1. Below is a summary of the data under quasi-hyperbolic model.
For details see Table 3 in Appendix A.2.
• HI: 31 individuals exhibit on average a discount factor, δ = 0.892 and a present-bias param-
eter, β = 0.989,
• LI: 34 individuals exhibit on average a discount factor, δ = 0.893 and a present-bias parameter,
β = 0.954,
• Total: 65 individuals exhibit on average a discount factor, δ = 0.893 and a present-bias
parameter, β = 0.973.
When we categorize the individuals with respect to whether they exhibit present-bias or not,
we have the following values. The individuals with present-bias, 15.3% of the total population
constitute an average discount factor of δ = 0.911 and an average present-bias of β = 0.854. The
rest of the population constitute an average discount factor of δ = 0.888 and naturally a present-bias
of β = 1.
3.3 Minimal return rate to induce savings
Consider an individual who discounts with δ for a one-month delay in a payment. In that case
we say the minimal total return to trigger the savings decision for this individual is: 1/δ. This
corresponds to a net return rate of the following expression:
r =
1
δ
− 1 (investing in the future) (3)
Note that some individuals may exhibit present-bias. Due to this, the return rates which trigger
these individuals to invest (or save) could be higher now than in the future. In the future the return
rate they require to invest is equivalent to Equation 3 above. However, for decisions involving the
present, the expression also is expanded by the present-bias parameter:
r =
1
βδ
− 1 (investing now) (4)
In Table A.2, we denote the return rate required today by rpresent and the rate for the future by,
rfuture. We provide these return rates both for present and future investment decisions. Obviously
for individuals without present-bias, return rates for both decisions (present and future) are the
same. Hence their values for Equations 3 and 4 are equal.
3.4 The Personal Determinants of Present Bias and Impatience
Here we seek the personal attributes of impatience (δ) and present bias (β). Note that impatience
decreases as δ increases. Similarly present bias (time-inconsistency or self-control) decreases as
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β increases. The complete list of individual parameters for δ and β can be found in Table 3 in
Appendix A.2. We try to measure the effects of age and income within the total pool of subjects.
The following two regression equation are estimated.
PresentBias = α1 + α2 × age + α3 × income (5)
Impatience = α1 + α2 × age + α3 × income (6)
The estimated parameters of Equations 5 and 6 are summarized in Table 1 below.
(δ) Impatience (β) Present Bias
Intercept 0.845(*) 1.010(*)
Age 0.001(***) -0.002(**)
Income 0.003 0.011(***)
R-square 0.04 0.15
Table 1: The marks (*), (**),(***) show the 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively.
As it can be seen from the second column of Table 1, only Age is significant (at 10% level) in
the impatience regression. Therefore we can conclude that different income groups have similar
impatience. However, both Age and Income are significant at 5% and 10% respectively in the
present-bias regression (third column of Table 1). As the results suggest, the present-bias parameter
increases with income. This means present-bias (hence time-inconsistency) decreases as income
increases. It is likely, then, that people with lower income are more easily tempted to spend in the
present time. Note also that among the individuals with present-bias, 83% of them are from the
low-income group. This makes the findings more striking as it is mainly the low-income individuals
that require savings schemes and commitment devices to eliminate the effects of present-bias in
their decision-making. The results in the third column reveals that the present bias parameter
decreases with age. That is, older people have smaller present bias parameter, i.e. they tend to
choose immediate monetary rewards as opposed to later rewards more than younger people do. This
finding is also very consistent with the above argument. Younger people have more future-looking
behavior than old people.
4 Conclusion
The decreasing savings ratio is of special importance especially in the developed countries. Here
we attempt to point out a behavioral aspect of failure in savings: the present-bias of individuals.
Although failure to save is not only a problem of the last decade, the concept is relatively new in
finance literature.
This study shows that the failure in savings can also be explained by behavioral aspects of
decision making. Our study clearly shows that in particular the low-income and old-age individuals
suffer present-bias problem. These individuals, therefore, fail to make decisions today that might
be more beneficial to them in the future, e.g., savings. This result can be explained by the fact
that high-income or young individuals have stronger connection with their future selves. Joshi and
Fast (2013) claims that power makes people more connected to their futures. In this sense, income
8
and being young can be perceived as power. This is nevertheless good news since with proper
commitment devices, such as offering present-biased individuals some saving schemes in the future,
an increase in overall savings can be achieved. The commitment devices can be calibrated via the
parameters such as the minimal return rate to induce savings, r.
In standard macroeconomic models, the first tool that comes to one’s mind to induce savings
can be performed via increasing the interest rates. However one can introduce commitment devices
at the existing rates to boost the savings of people with present-bias (which are very likely to be
from the poor side of the town).
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A Appendix
A.1 The questionnaire
1. Name:
Surname:
2. Date of Birth:
3. Do you own a car?
4. Do you pay rent for the house you live in?
5. Please state your monthly income:
[ ] 0− 1000 TL [ ] 1000− 2000 TL [ ] 2000− 3000 TL
[ ] 3000− 4000 TL [ ] 4000− 5000 TL [ ] 5000− . . . TL
6. Please answer the following 19 questions by ticking one option in each. You are requested
to choose between payments in different points in time (today, in 1 month, in 6 months,
or in 7 months).
Part 1 Option 1 (today) Option 2 (1 month later)
Question (1) [ ] Payment today: 75 TL [ ] Payment 1 month later: 80 TL
Question (2) [ ] Payment today: 70 TL [ ] Payment 1 month later: 80 TL
Question (3) [ ] Payment today: 65 TL [ ] Payment 1 month later: 80 TL
Question (4) [ ] Payment today: 60 TL [ ] Payment 1 month later: 80 TL
Question (5) [ ] Payment today: 50 TL [ ] Payment 1 month later: 80 TL
Question (6) [ ] Payment today: 40 TL [ ] Payment 1 month later: 80 TL
Part 2 Option 1 (today) Option 2 (6 months later)
Question (7) [ ] Payment today: 75 TL [ ] Payment 6 months later: 80 TL
Question (8) [ ] Payment today: 70 TL [ ] Payment 6 months later: 80 TL
Question (9) [ ] Payment today: 65 TL [ ] Payment 6 months later: 80 TL
Question (10) [ ] Payment today: 60 TL [ ] Payment 6 months later: 80 TL
Question (11) [ ] Payment today: 50 TL [ ] Payment 6 months later: 80 TL
Question (12) [ ] Payment today: 40 TL [ ] Payment 6 months later: 80 TL
Question (13) [ ] Payment today: 30 TL [ ] Payment 6 months later: 80 TL
Part 3 Option 1 (6 months later) Option 2 (7 months later)
Question (14) [ ] Payment 6 months later: 75 TL [ ] Payment 7 months later: 80 TL
Question (15) [ ] Payment 6 months later: 70 TL [ ] Payment 7 months later: 80 TL
Question (16) [ ] Payment 6 months later: 65 TL [ ] Payment 7 months later: 80 TL
Question (17) [ ] Payment 6 months later: 60 TL [ ] Payment 7 months later: 80 TL
Question (18) [ ] Payment 6 months later: 50 TL [ ] Payment 7 months later: 80 TL
Question (19) [ ] Payment 6 months later: 40 TL [ ] Payment 7 months later: 80 TL
Table 2: The questionnaire
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A.2 Discount factors δ and present-bias parameters β
Low Income High Income
Ind. β δ rpresent rfuture Ind. β δ rpresent rfuture
1 0.931 0.907 0.184 0.102 1 0.690 0.844 0.717 0.185
2 0.817 0.956 0.280 0.046 2 0.962 0.942 0.103 0.062
3 0.834 0.937 0.280 0.067 3 1 0.922 0.085 0.085
4 0.817 0.956 0.280 0.046 4 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
5 0.864 0.909 0.273 0.100 5 1 0.965 0.036 0.036
6 0.931 0.907 0.184 0.102 6 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
7 0.848 0.921 0.280 0.085 7 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
8 0.798 0.871 0.439 0.148 8 1 0.965 0.036 0.036
9 0.902 0.867 0.279 0.153 9 1 0.965 0.036 0.036
10 0.854 0.922 0.271 0.085 10 1 0.958 0.043 0.043
11 1 0.883 0.133 0.133 11 1 0.859 0.164 0.164
12 1 0.914 0.094 0.094 12 1 0.946 0.057 0.057
13 1 0.939 0.065 0.065 13 1 0.958 0.043 0.043
14 1 0.859 0.164 0.164 14 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
15 1 0.847 0.181 0.181 15 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
16 1 0.922 0.085 0.085 16 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
17 1 0.902 0.109 0.109 17 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
18 1 0.926 0.080 0.080 18 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
19 1 0.883 0.133 0.133 19 1 0.926 0.080 0.080
20 1 0.939 0.065 0.065 20 1 0.939 0.065 0.065
21 1 0.920 0.087 0.087 21 1 0.801 0.249 0.249
22 1 0.898 0.113 0.113 22 1 0.787 0.271 0.271
23 1 0.914 0.094 0.094 23 1 0.787 0.271 0.271
24 1 0.878 0.139 0.139 24 1 0.787 0.271 0.271
25 1 0.737 0.357 0.357 25 1 0.836 0.196 0.196
26 1 0.737 0.357 0.357 26 1 0.878 0.139 0.139
27 1 0.801 0.249 0.249 27 1 0.883 0.133 0.133
28 1 0.822 0.216 0.216 28 1 0.902 0.109 0.109
29 1 0.891 0.123 0.123 29 1 0.883 0.133 0.133
30 1 0.951 0.052 0.052 30 1 0.883 0.133 0.133
31 1 0.969 0.032 0.032 31 1 0.859 0.164 0.164
32 - - - - 32 1 0.908 0.102 0.102
33 - - - - 33 1 0.883 0.133 0.133
34 - - - - 34 1 0.883 0.133 0.133
Avg: 0.955 0.893 0.183 0.125 0.989 0.893 0.140 0.124
Table 3: The complete data
The individuals with present-bias are put at the top of both low and high income groups.
Note that values for rpresent and rfuture are different only for individuals with present-bias, i.e.,
individuals with β < 1. For simplicity, all the decimals are restricted to 3 digits only.
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